The body is the self’s border with the world. But the body is also a field that is subject to border restrictions, invasions and transgressions – from immigration lines, to surgery that penetrates the body’s borders, to form-and-function-altering technologies such as nanomedicine, where not only the shape and appearance but also the capacities, abilities and functions of the body and its organs are radically altered.

This essay explores the dimensions of three bodies whose borders have today been rendered porous as never before. It analyses not only the acts of border crossing, but also the discourses that validate body/border crossings. The choice of bodies is based on the assumption that, arguably, these are sites where border crossings have been most intensely experienced in the last decades of the 20th and initial years of the 21st century.

II. THE BODY OF TORTURE

Literary/cultural theorist Elaine Scarry (1985) has argued that a vast distance separates the body of the tortured from that of the torturer, a distance computed in terms of pain suffered (by the tortured body) and the absence of pain (by the torturer). In the case of the sadism reported from the prisons of Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, it is the deliberate situating of the body at or beyond a border that first opens up this terrifying distance. Or, going by what happens, it is by locating the body at or beyond a particular kind of threshold, as we shall see, that pain is sanctioned.

The border therefore functions as the measure or location on which the body’s pain may be predicated.

In Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the processes of discursively locating the detainee’s body at specific borders paved the way for the act of torture.

Borders of the Body, and the Body Politic: Six Theses

A memorandum (dated 28-12-2001) from Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals, to William Hayes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, began by
citing a US Supreme Court ruling: “An alien held outside the United States cannot seek the writ of habeas corpus”. The memo stated: “... the same reasoning applies to GBC [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba] because it is outside the sovereign territory of the United States” (The Torture Papers, pp. 30-31; hereafter in this essay, TP). And continues: “We are aware of no basis on which a federal court would grant different litigant rights to a habeas petitioner simply because he is an enemy alien, other than to deny him habeas jurisdiction in the first place” (TP, p. 36).

Now, the declared logic of habeas corpus invokes the centrality of the body in the evidentiary dimension of legal matters: it asks that the body of the prisoner/accused be physically presented. The body cannot be kept hidden away, out of the sight of those who can demand (to see it) it as their right. In the above memo, the justice department officials perform a rhetorical sleight-of-hand that has clearly to do with the body as frontier and boundary.

First, it argues that a body situated outside the “sovereign territory” (or body politic) of the US cannot demand habeas corpus as a legal right.

**Thesis One: The Body is Outside the Border, as it Were, and Therefore Has No Right to Be ‘Presented’**

Further, it also proposes that physically non-presentable bodies (of prisoners) mark the border between the US laws and any other laws. On the one hand, the habeas corpus ‘present the body’ laws do not apply to bodies outside the US territory. To add one more layer of complexity, the description of the non-presentable body as ‘alien’ identifies it as a body from the outside.

**Thesis Two: The Very Absence of the Legal Right to Presentability Marks the Border Between the US and Other Territories**

A later memo (dated 9-01-2002) from John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, Special Counsel to William Hayes II, argues that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo for various reasons. These reasons also carry subtexts relating to the border. According to the US government, the Taliban – and here Al Qaeda is coded as Taliban and vice versa, a reflexive blurring of borders, so to speak – was not a government but more of a “non-governmental organization that used military force to pursue its religious and political ideology”. Moreover, and significantly, Afghanistan is a “failed state” (TP, pp. 38-39). Hence, the US argues, the Prisoner of War (POW)

**In Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the Processes of Discursively Locating the Detainee’s Body at Specific Borders Paved the Way for the Act of Torture**
conventions do not apply to Taliban detainees. The detainees do not belong to a recognised country served by a recognised government; hence they fall into the category of *persona non grata*. The particular non-recognition of the Taliban and of Afghanistan by the US reduced the detainees’ bodies to “bare life”, exemplifying the figure of Giorgio Agamben’s *homo sacer*: a body that can be killed but not sacrificed (1998; 2005, pp. 3-4). Political legitimacy and/or its lack is inscribed onto and collapsed into the bodies of the Guantanamo detainees.²

**THESIS THREE: THE BORDER BETWEEN A BODY POLITIC AND A BODY IS COLLAPSED**

A draft memo (dated 19-03-2004) to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the US President, from the Assistant Attorney General, argues that the US may “relocate ‘protected persons’ (whether they are illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation” (*TP*, pp. 367-68, 374-80).³ These threatening bodies will be taken across borders so that US borders can stay protected from future invasions.

**THESIS FOUR: THE SUSPECT BODY BECOMES THE SUBJECT OF INTERROGATION/TORTURE PROCEDURES WHEN THE BORDERS BETWEEN NATIONS ARE CROSSED**

Afghan and, as it turns out, Iraqi bodies are outside the purview of human rights, POW conventions and the habeas corpus rationale because their former ‘non-government’ lies outside the definition of ‘government’ or nation state. The two bodies (body and body politic) are therefore interchangeable: both occupy the transgressive space of equivocal (il)legality.

**THESIS FIVE: GEOPOLITICAL BORDERS CONSIGN BODIES TO THIS OR THAT SIDE OF RIGHTS AND HUMANE TREATMENT**

The detainee’s body is now located at the border between the US and Taliban armies; between the legitimate POW and the ‘unlawful combatant’; between US laws and other laws. It is interesting that a body suspected of terrorist activity can be prosecuted irrespective of where the alleged activities took place, under the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.272 (2001), amended section 2340A (popularly known as the Torture Convention).

**THESIS SIX: ANY BODY SUSPECTED OF BEING A TERRORIST BODY, IN ANY LOCATION, I.E., EVEN THOSE ACROSS US BORDERS, CAN BE PROSECUTED**

The body, through these six (hypo)theses, is now cleared for torture.
The Tortured Body and the Political Frontiers of Suffering

Once the body has been made ready for torture, the arguments are shaped to revolve around the frontiers of the body’s endurance.

The procedures begin fairly innocuously, with an enquirey about what the body can endure. If, as Scarry argues, pain marks the border between the tortured and the torturer, the detainees and American soldiers inside Abu Ghraib are indeed divided into those who experience pain and those who inflict it. The sense of the body-as-frontier is used to describe the state of the tortured in, for instance, an account by philosophical essayist Jean Améry, who underwent torture by the Nazis following his arrest in Belgium in 1943. Améry writes: “[…] the other person, opposite whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can exist only as long as he does not touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality on me with the first blow… a mechanism is set in motion that enables me to rectify the border violation by the other person” (Sussman, 2006, p. 227).

Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee’s memo (dated 01-08-2002) to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, defined torture as something that “must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain to amount to torture… it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years” (TP, p. 172). Hence by this logic, torture was only that which induced pain so severe that it was difficult for the victim to endure. Here torture is the political frontier of suffering: how much can the (American) torturer inflict, and how much can the (Afghan ‘terrorist’) detainee endure? The index of pain is what separates the two kinds of politicised and racialised bodies here; and the governmental memos treat the question as one of pushing pain, inflicted by one kind of body and endured by another, to a certain physical limit.

But by what mechanism exactly can we measure the degree of pain that accompanies organ failure?

The question of endurance is of course linked to the limits of the body – how much can a body take? This is not a query from the interrogating officers alone. It is an issue of debate for the higher echelons of the military bureaucracy itself. A memo (dated 11-27-2002) from William Hayes II, General Counsel, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, mentions that part of the interrogation technique includes making the detainee stand for four hours. Rumsfeld’s response, handwritten at the end of the memo, reads: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” (TP, p. 237). Rumsfeld’s response is really a question about the body’s limits and carefully ignores the completely different circumstances under which the two bodies (his and the detainee’s) stand. What separates the two bodies is a frontier of suffering: one voluntary, controlled (Rumsfeld’s) and one forced and uncontrolled. The fact that the difference in bodies is also racial strengthens the case for a political frontier of suffering.
A memo (dated 12-10-2002) from Michael Dunlavey, Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, to the Department of Defense sought permission to “approve the interrogation techniques” (TP, pp. 225-28). In an earlier memo (dated 11-10-2002) Dunlavey had argued in favour of the techniques (ibid.). A Category III technique mentioned in Dunlavey’s memo included “the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family (TP, p. 228).”

Central to the question of the detainee’s body as border is a constellation of pain-inducing modes. On the one hand, these test the limits of the body’s endurance (as we have seen above, torture’s definition is predicated on the limits of pain a body can endure). On the other, they locate the detainee’s body at the border of the danger/safety of their families – that is, the detainee’s body stands metaphorically between the prison wardens and their own families.

This particular torture technique’s emphasis on the detainee’s family means that the threat of pain and death is extended beyond the border of the detainee’s body to that of his kin and brethren. It takes away the singularity of the detainee’s pain by implying that everybody in his family can be subject to the same treatment. In one case, a detainee’s sworn statement recorded on 16 January 2004 asserts that he is threatened with the rape of his wife (TP, p. 522). The inflicting of pain is made imminent, or augmented, to encompass other bodies, thus expanding the frontier.

One mode of identifying an act as torture is based on the effect it produces. A Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogation in the Global War on Terrorism (6-03-2003) cites earlier judgements where an act can be categorised as a threat by examining whether a “reasonable person in the same circumstances would conclude that a threat had been made” (TP, pp. 249-50). This idea of the recognisability of a threat by a “reasonable person” as the criterion for judging a detainee’s response to threat sets up another body-limit: that of “reason”. It shifts the experience of threat/torture from the detainee’s body on to another, “reasonable” one, while ignoring the irreducible difference in contexts.

Later, the Taguba Report of March 2004 listed the various modes of torture used inside Abu Ghraib (TP, pp. 416-17). The annexures include sworn statements of detainees in which the torture they experienced is described in detail (TP, pp. 472-527). The statements make it very clear that the bodies were made to experience pain well beyond limits, and the Taguba report indicts the personnel in charge of Abu Ghraib for this. Significant to the thinking of the torturers is the intensely racialised awareness that the sadistically violated detained bodies are all non-white.

A MEMO TO DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MENTIONS THAT PART OF THE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE INCLUDES MAKING THE DETAINEE STAND FOR FOUR HOURS. RUMSFELD’S RESPONSE, HANDWRITTEN AT THE END OF THE MEMO, READS: “HOWEVER, I STAND FOR 8-10 HOURS A DAY. WHY IS STANDING LIMITED TO 4 HOURS?”
II. The Body of Information

In this day of bio-informatics and computational biology, the body is viewed as a set of data coded into computers to be transmitted and maybe reassembled elsewhere. The bio-informational body is also one whose frontiers have been altered significantly.

Digital Humans and Their Borders

Two kinds of digital humans can be discerned today, and both call into question the body border.

First, digital enterprises such as the Visible Human Project (VHP) (www.nlm.nih.gov) or the Centre for Human Simulation Project (CHS) (www.uchsc.edu/sm/chs): both render the body into code.

Digitised and rendered into jpg images or real video, these bodies know no borders except one: copyright laws. That a person's dataset – the first digital human atlas was made from real cadavers – should be copyrighted for use gestures at the border between body as a usable set of tools and a body as a marketable set of infinitely iterable information. On the website of the National Library of Medicine (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/visible/visible_gallery.html), a body is writ large in cyberspace, to be radically altered, edited, frozen. Unlike cinematic or televised bodies, these digital forms allow us to change our focus: we can choose to 'fly through' the Visible Human Project's dataset. The digital body does not have a border, anyone can traverse it, manipulate it, see it differently or get a closer look.

In this digitised form the human body is ethereal, taking the shape of the programme that runs it and the sensibilities of the viewer who clicks on it. While in a sense it does have a fixed 'form' – there is only so much manipulation possible with CHS models – the technology still enables us to see the body very differently. In fact, we see bones and skin dissolving as we click – another border has been crossed here when the bone seems to turn ghostly. The “digital uncanny”, as Catherine Waldby (1997) termed it, is this absence of borders, where the spectral body slips across one's screen, now familiar, now unique. It is a body that can be accessed from across any border.

Second, the live body that is hijacked into the cyberspace network and diffracts into a series of information flows.

The signals of circuits and the energies of users combine, and are traversed by impulses, photons, scripts and signifiers, so that we have a mammoth user-body whose borders cannot be precisely located. Katherine Hayles (1999) described the posthuman as one whose identity is dispersed throughout the cybernetic circuit. This 'cyborg' body has merged seamlessly with the hardware and electronic data flows. The relentless electronic dispersal opens up bodies to inputs from the system. Inside and outside merge, as one is integrated into some other space or body.
Literature and popular culture have both been fascinated by this proliferating interface of borderless bodies. Cyberpunk novelist William Gibson effectively describes such a borderless, a-geographic body wired into the network. In *Neuromancer* (1984), Case sees through Molly's body as they are wired together: “the abrupt jolt into other flesh” (p. 56). In *Pattern Recognition* (2003), the website becomes Cayce Pollard's home, “like a familiar café that exists somehow outside of geography and beyond time zones” (p. 4). In *Idoru* (1997), there is no space outside the “home” of cyberspace: “there was no there there” (p. 43). The body here has no border, just as the digital space there has no borders. In the work of contemporary artists such as Eduardo Kac and Alexis Rockman (www.genomicart.org) and the Pig Wings project (www.tca.uwa.edu.au/pig), the borders of human and animal bodies are blurred, reflecting recent advances in genetic engineering where DNA from various species can be mixed and matched to create new, perhaps “monstrous” forms (Nayar, 2007). Merging with machines, data and other ‘avatars’, digital and networked humans abandon their bodies as they enter virtual worlds...

The Borders of Bio-Informatic Bodies

To shift conceptual attention from the amalgam of digitised and networked bodies to the genetic body requires an unsettling inward turn.

The Human Genome Project (http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome) transcodes (i.e., translates data into another format) the human body into numbers to be recovered at another time and place, on a screen. Cultural theorist Eugene Thacker calls the body in such conditions “biomedia”, where the body is the medium and the media themselves cannot be distinguished from the human body – thus marking the collapse of the border between biological substrate (the body) and the medium (2004, p. 13).

The body here is body-in-code, whose very borders have been embedded in technics. The body is increasingly made available in the form of data. The data are compiled from and through the body, which is wired into data processing machines (that range from the ECG machine to DNA testing units). The information flows from the body into the machine. The ‘cyborg’ is located somewhere between the body and the machine’s datasets...

There are many frontiers here. The genetic code lies inside the body, as its DNA. Though the body cannot be treated as reducible to its genetic code – genetic determinism ignores other factors such as environment, socialisation and class in the making of a human (Nayar, 2006) – the border/container of the body has been radically altered. Part of its secret code that was once inside us is now locked up in an external dataset accessible from outside. The mystery of our material being is offered outside of itself.

The “digital uncanny” is this absence of borders, where the spectral body slips across one’s screen, now familiar, now unique. *It is a body that can be accessed from across any border.*
Paradoxically, even as the information flows through the body's borders into databases, the technology infiltrates deeper and deeper into the body. While scans cover the body's visible surface and penetrate through rays/radiation, genetic engineering knows no borders. A set of molecules and atoms becomes the code of life through an act of interpretation. Chromosomes become the new hieroglyphs of a very ancient language, a borderless ‘body-text’ of very high ‘resolution’: the investigation penetrates dermis, membrane, helical strands, to enter the sanctum that is both existential and ineffable, decrypting the persistent secrets of individual character, physiognomy and health.

The programme moves across borders: skin to bone to tissue to cytoplasm and back, each matrix reflecting and informing the other.

The HGP describes its project as “one of the great feats of exploration in history – an inward voyage of discovery rather than an outward exploration of the planet or the cosmos". It continually reinforces this rhetoric of expansion and exploration – even producing a Genome Atlas (http://wishart.biology.ualberta.ca/BacMap/) – through invoking the motif of the frontier. For instance,

The Age of Discovery was the age of da Gama, Columbus, and Magellan, an era when European civilization reached out to the Far East and thus filled many of the voids in its map of the world… The Human Genome Project is thus the next stage in an epic voyage of discovery…

(http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome)

In addition, the Human Genome Project “can be compared to the Apollo programme bringing humanity to the moon”, according to the website. The recurrent use of tropes of discovery and expansion echoes earlier colonial discourses, wherein borders were meant to be shifted outward as part of the processes of subjugation. Now the genetic code is the new border, one that demarcates peoples and ethnicities.

This new border must also be brought under the purview of science – more specifically, Euro-American science that generates information that could be sold to private corporations; this is declared on the website as one of HGP’s own stated goals (“transfer related technologies to the private sector”). Ethnic groups can no longer protect their cultural and genetic borders, as databases code them into numbers to be retrieved at any given moment by anyone able to afford the fee.

III. The Technologised Body

Technology has turned inwards. The tools of the trade can now be implanted in a form of endo-technologising. Increasingly, bodies can be seamlessly sutured to machines on an everyday basis, and not only as scientific projects.
Technology, Inc. (orporated)

Australian artist Stelarc wired his body into the World Wide Web so that people keying in commands from elsewhere could get his body to move. He swallowed a camera and filmed his insides. He attached extra arms and an extra ear (www.stelarc.va.com.au). In a highly publicised series of research projects, professor of cybernetics Kevin Warwick had electronic chips implanted within his body in order to operate doors and appliances in his surroundings, had his nervous system wired to the internet, and also had a smaller array implanted in his wife in order to communicate with her ‘telepathically’. Both Stelarc and Warwick are cases of how somatic integration with machines radically alters the frontiers of the body’s autonomy and expands the horizons of the body’s borders. Everything is within one’s grasp and reach; borders are limited only by the extent of the electromagnetic signal, not the length of the arm. Machines that once lay outside the body’s borders have shifted within.

Our machines: our selves, now...

Cosmetic Borders

Orlan is a French artist who performs cosmetic surgery on her face and telecasts it live, as an expression of ‘carnal art’. She has altered her face so much that she intends to ask for a whole new identity. In one exhibit, Orlan took the features of various ‘models’ of beauty, including Botticelli’s Venus and da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. She then put in two horns, and the largest nose possible for her face (see www.orlan.net). “Skin is deceiving”, she quotes from the psychoanalyst Eugenie Lemoine-Lucioni.

Orlan alters her first border, her first home: her skin. She inhabits a new ‘inside’ (of the border/skin) with each alteration. Skin is also, medically speaking, the largest organ in the human body. It is what we first encounter when we meet anyone; it is the first border we cross when we touch. Orlan draws attention to the fact that so much of our social interaction relies upon the recognition of this border: personal space, attraction or its opposite, aesthetics, texture. By deliberately invoking classic models of beauty from earlier eras, Orlan also calls into question our constructions of beauty and their social interpretations, as the body border may evaluated, respected, rejected, validated by the community.

The entire pathology of racism is based on one potent and direct signifier: the colour of one’s body-border. And as a pragmatic strategy we consider “improving” our looks, in order to facilitate the necessary crossing of social borders into the terrain of acceptance and affirmation...

Borderless Body Geographies

The body’s borders are also being altered significantly in less spectacular ways. Take for instance the now ubiquitous mobile phone. Research in various countries has shown that people are rarely more than a metre away from their mobiles (Srivastava, 2006). An entirely new geography emerges through the extension of the body’s borders via personal
communication technology. Nokia's claim to be foremost with regard to 'connecting people' is not simply about the technology: it is about the erasing of borders between bodies in a virtual world.

Further, another kind of body border is crossed: your intimate conversations are now subject to 'enforced eavesdropping' when you speak into the mobile in public. The mobile phone alters the boundaries between public and private when the body behaves 'inappropriately' in either/both spaces. Nokia, announcing its 9300i with internet connectivity, asks us to "make the world your office" (Nokia flier, 2006), thus proposing a radical shift of body geographies. Restaurants, movie theatres, the bus stop and the supermarket are transformed from public spaces into semi-private ones when your body, holding the mobile phone, converses with another body elsewhere, a conversation that does not fit your body's present location or your supposed task within that space.

Mobile phones, like most technologies of communication, are about distance. Distances, near or far, become irrelevant when suitable modes of communication are available. Mobile phones particularly fit into this ongoing discourse of distance, since all companies and services and their advertisements urge us, with suitable emotion, to 'be in touch' with family, friends and colleagues via the mobile. What is surely ironic is the metaphor of 'touch' that all communications technologies use: touch is a proximate sense that erases but is conscious of body borders – the touch of the other's hand on my skin-border. All touch requires physical contact and sharing of space. The use of the metaphor in the rhetoric of communications suggests an obsession with the device-enabled obliteration of distance. However, technology inverts the meaning: it offers reliable communication, correspondence and connectivity – across distances.

With personal communication technologies practically moulded to our hands, ears, skins, yet another body border has perhaps irreversibly collapsed.

Geopolitics, medical and informational technologies, even art: today, these fields include a focus on the anatomical and physiological possibilities, impossibilities and borders of the body. Human borders with the world, dependent thus far upon the sanctity of the somatic frontier, are increasingly called into question. This essay has discussed only three categories of bodies/borders, their contours invaded, altered, shifted outward and inward, through torture, genetics and digital circuitry. But even this limited analysis might legitimately push the assertion that in the new millennium, whether we like it or not, our most intimately claimed borders are being more and more 'substantially' embodied.

Editors' Note
For accounts of the relational dynamics and aesthetics of "bio-informational" bodies, see Deb Kamal Ganguly, "Pixels of Memory on the Hypertextualised I", Sarai Reader 06: Turbulence (CSDS, 2006, Delhi), pp. 140-49; and Andreas Broekmann, "Playing Wild!", ibid., pp. 150-59.
Reader 06 online text: http://www.sarai.net/journal/reader_06.html
Notes

1. A memo (01-22-2002) to Alberto Gonzales from Jay Bybee, the Assistant Attorney General, argued that the Taliban did not have a recognisable hierarchic command-and-control structure, did not wear distinctive uniforms, operated in the open with their weapons visible, and did not always follow the rules of war (TP, pp. 110-11). This is also emphasised in a follow-up memo from Bybee to Gonzales (ibid., pp. 136-38). It is important to note here that the bodies of Taliban soldiers determine the future situation of their compatriots detained in Guantanamo Bay. In his memo (dated 02-07-2002) to the Vice-President, Secretary of State and other senior functionaries, President George Bush accepted these conclusions, but added: “[...] Our values as a nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment” (TP, pp. 134-35). The memo explicitly locates the detainees outside legal entitlements, and brings in other non-legal norms (“values as a nation”), thereby once again crossing borders between enforceable laws and abstract moral-ethical ones.

2. The debates about the legality of torture procedures were about Afghan detainees in Guantanamo Bay. And yet, as Karen Greenberg (one of the editors of TP) points out, these procedures were applied to prisoners in Iraq as well (TP, xviii). This is another instance of body-related procedures that cross borders, where every imprisoned body lies outside the law, and marks the limits of the law (in this case the Geneva Conventions). Anybody arrested as an ‘enemy alien’, irrespective of the site of incarceration (Iraq’s Abu Ghraib or Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay), lies outside this border.

3. “Protected persons”, in these memos, may be those “accused of offences” or those who have not been accused (TP, pp. 374-80).

4. In his extensively documented and pathbreaking work on Nazi masculinities, Klaus Theweleit argues that in torture the victim gradually disappears altogether. Theweleit shifts the focus to the body of the torturer, suggesting that torture enables the torturer to define himself: “… the torturer only calls a halt when the victim’s loss of contours has allowed his own body to gain definition” (Male Fantasies, Vol. II, pp. 304-5).

5. See Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991). Haraway calls the late 20th century a “mythic” time, when we are all “cyborgs”: theorised and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism. This cyborg gives us our politics; it is a condensed image of imagination and reality. The cyborg is irreverent, oppositional, ironic, impartial and completely without innocence.

References


New Cartographies / Old Boundaries