No subject

scene of an armed conflict. The crimes of which Dragoljub Kunarac,
Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic were found guilty by the Trial Chamber
were closely related to this armed conflict. Non-Serb civilians were
killed, raped or otherwise mistreated as a direct consequence of that
armed conflict. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic also participated in this
campaign which sought, inter alia, to rid the area of Foca of its
non-Serb inhabitants. One of the targets of the campaign were the Muslim
civilians, women in particular. They were detained in various centres
where the conditions of hygiene were intolerable and where they were
subjected to many acts of physical violence, including multiple rapes.
The criminal conduct of the three appellants was part of this systematic
attack on the non-Serb civilians. All three knew that the area of Foca
was the scene of an armed conflict. They also knew that an attack on the
non-Serb civilian population had been launched and that their criminal
acts occurred within or were part of this attack.

On 22 February 2001, the Trial Chamber found Dragoljub Kunarac guilty of
crimes against humanity on the counts of enslavement, rape and torture
as well as violations of the laws and customs of war on the counts of
rape and torture. In the same decision, Radomir Kovac was found guilty
of crimes against humanity on the counts of enslavement and rape as well
as violations of the laws and customs of war on the count of outrages
upon personal dignity. Zoran Vukovic was found guilty of crimes against
humanity on the counts of rape and torture as well as violations of the
laws and customs of war on the counts of rape and torture. The three
accused were given single sentences of 28, 20 and 12 years’ imprisonment
respectively.

On 6 March 2001, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic filed a notice of
appeal against the Trial Chamber Judgement and sentence. On 7 March
2001, Dragoljub Kunarac did so as well.

The Appellants presented several grounds of appeal. The Appeals Chamber
noted that five of them were common to at least two of the three
Appellants and dealt with them in Chapters III to VII of this Appeals
Judgement. Each of the grounds raised by one of the Appellants alone is
addressed in a separate chapter.

I. COMMON GROUNDS OF APPEAL RELATING TO ARTICLE 3 OF THE STATUTE:

A. Existence of an armed conflict and the nexus of the criminal conduct
therewith:

According to the Appellants, the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that
there was an armed conflict in two municipalities bordering the
municipality of Foca, namely the municipalities of Gacko and Kalinovik.
Given that these municipalities are contiguous and neighbouring
municipalities of Foca and given also that the Appellants conceded that
there was an armed conflict in the area of Foca, the Appeals Chamber
considers that the Prosecutor did not have to prove that there was an
armed conflict in each and every square inch of the area in question
recalling that the state of armed conflict is not limited to the areas
of actual military combat but exists across the entire territory under
the control of the warring parties. Ample evidence was adduced before
the Trial Chamber to justifiably conclude that an armed conflict was
taking place in the territory of the three municipalities in question.

These grounds then led to the question of whether the Trial Chamber
committed an error in formulating the criterion applicable for
determining whether the required nexus between the armed conflict and
the criminal behaviour did indeed exist. All three Appellants held that
the criterion used by the Appeals Chamber was insufficient. In their
opinion, the existence of a nexus should have been established for each
crime and it would have been appropriate to ask whether the acts in
question may be perpetrated even if there is no armed conflict. The
Appeals Chamber states that the required nexus is not however one of
cause and effect between the armed conflict and the commission of the
crime. It is sufficient that the existence of the armed conflict must
have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit
the crime, his decision to commit it, the manner in which he committed
it or the purpose for which he committed it. Consequently, the Trial
Chamber was justified in taking into account, inter alia, the following
factors: the fact that the perpetrators are combatants; the fact that
the victims are non-combatants; the fact that the victims are members of
the opposing party and the fact that the acts may be said to serve the
ultimate goal of a military campaign. However, in this case, it was
established that the perpetrators acted in furtherance of or under the
guise of the armed conflict. This is sufficient to conclude that their
acts were closely related to that conflict as required under Article 3
of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber can consider only that the Trial
Chamber’s finding on that point is unimpeachable.

B. Concerning the material scope of Article 3 of the Statute and common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions:
In accordance with the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the Appeals
Chamber does not accept the Appellants’ unsupported assertions that
Article 3 of the Statute is restricted in such a way as to be limited to
the protection of property and the proper use of permitted weapons, and
that it does not cover serious violations of Common article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions and that it is concerned only with the rights of
warring parties as opposed to the protection of private individuals.
This ground is therefore rejected.

II. COMMON GROUNDS OF APPEAL RELATING TO ARTICLE 5 OF THE STATUTE:
The Appellants raise a number of complaints in respect of the chapeau
elements of Article 5 of the Statute relating to crimes against humanity
as established by the Trial Chamber.

A. Nexus with the armed conflict under Article 5 of the Statute:

This requirement set out in Article 5 is only a prerequisite to the
exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It is satisfied merely by the
proof that there was an armed conflict and, contrary to the Appellants’
arguments, does not require a material nexus between the acts of the
accused and the armed conflict. In adopting the Trial Chamber’s
conclusion that there was an armed conflict in the area and on the dates
set out in the Indictments, the Appeals Chamber rejects these grounds of
appeal.

B. Existence of an "attack":

The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber erred in stating that there
was an attack on the non-Serb civilian population of Foca. The Appeals
Chamber is satisfied however that the Trial Chamber correctly defined
and interpreted the concept of "attack" which it regarded as a type of
conduct resulting in acts of violence. In the definition of a crime
against humanity, the word "attack" is not limited to the use of armed
force but encompasses, inter alia, situations in which persons not
taking any active part in the hostilities are mistreated or situations
in which a non-combatant entity is targeted – that is, any civilian
population. The Trial Chamber’s conclusions in relation to the attack
are unimpeachable and the Appeals Chamber therefore rejects these
grounds of appeal.

C. Condition according to which the attack must be directed against any
civilian population:

The Appellants state that what happened to the non-Serb citizens of the
Foca municipality was not the regrettable consequence of an attack
directed against the civilian population as such, but rather the
unfortunate result of a legitimate military operation. In other words,
there was "collateral damage". Certain elements, however, were
sufficient to reasonably convince the Trial Chamber Judges that the
attack was effectively directed against a civilian "population", rather
than against a limited number of individuals chosen at random, inter
alia, the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status
of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack,
the nature of the crimes committed in its course... The Appeals Chamber
is satisfied that the Trial Chamber did not err in concluding that such
an attack occurred. Moreover, in identifying the attacked "population",
that is the non-Serb population of Foca, it was thus able to discern an
attempt to disguise criminal acts as a military enterprise. These
grounds of appeal are therefore rejected.

D. "Widespread or systematic" nature of the attack:

According to the Appellants, even if accepted, the evidence of the
crimes committed against the non-Serb civilians would not suffice to
conclude that the attack was widespread or systematic, due to its
restricted character both in terms of significance and quantity. The
Appellants add that in legal terms the attack must be widespread and
systematic. However, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial
Chamber correctly defined the adjective "widespread" as referring inter
alia to the number of victims of the attack and to its being carried out
on a wide scale and the adjective "systematic" as referring to the
organised or repetitive character of the acts of violence. In order to
determine what constitutes a "widespread" or "systematic" attack, a
Trial Chamber relies in particular on the means, methods and resources
of the attackers, the consequences of the attack upon the targeted
population, the number of victims, the discriminatory nature of the
acts, the possible participation of officials or authorities or any
other identifiable patterns of the crimes... Moreover, the Appeals
Chamber correctly, and in accordance with law, recalled that the attack
had to either be "widespread" or "systematic", specifying that the
requirement is disjunctive rather than cumulative. In relation to the
circumstances of this case, the Trial Chamber did not err in concluding
that the attack against the non-Serb civilian population of Foca was
systematic. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects these grounds of
appeal.

E. Nexus with the attack and the required mens rea for crimes against
humanity:

The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that
there was a nexus between their acts and the attack because they were
not even aware of that attack, because their acts had a purely military
character and because they in no way wished to participate in a possible
attack against the civilian population. As properly noted by the Trial
Chamber, the nexus between the acts of the accused and the attack
consists of two elements: the commission of an act which is objectively
part of the attack coupled with knowledge on the part of the accused
that there is an attack on the civilian population and that his act is
part thereof. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the Trial Chamber
defined and applied the appropriate criterion regarding the nexus
between the acts of the accused and the attack. These grounds of appeal
are therefore rejected.

III. GROUNDS OF APPEAL RELATING TO THE TRIAL CHAMBER’S DEFINITION OF THE
OFFENCES:

A. Definition of the crime of enslavement:

The Appellants propose to substitute the following elements for those
considered by the Trial Chamber for the crime of enslavement: the
accused must have considered the victim "as its own ownership", there
must have been the constant and clear lack of consent of the victim, the
victim must have been detained for an indefinite or at least for a
prolonged period of time and the accused must have had the intent to
detain the victim under constant control for a prolonged period in order
to use the victim for sexual acts. However, the Appeals Chamber does not
accept the premise that lack of consent is a constituent element of the
crime. It abides by the Trial Chamber’s decision attributing a relative
importance to the duration of the detention and not considering it an
element of the crime. It concurs with the Trial Chamber that the
required mens rea for this crime consists of the intentional exercise of
a power attached to the right of ownership over the victims without it
being necessary to prove that the accused intended to detain the victims
under constant control for a prolonged period in order to use them for
sexual acts. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that
the Trial Chamber’s definition of the crime of enslavement is not too
broad and does indeed reflect customary international law at the time
when the alleged crimes were committed. The grounds of appeal relating
to the definition of the crime of enslavement are therefore rejected.

B. Definition of the crime of rape:

According to the Appellants, the crime of rape requires, in addition to
penetration, the showing of two additional elements: force or threat of
force and the victim’s "continuous" or "genuine" resistance. The Appeals
Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber’s definition of rape following
its extensive review of the continental and common law legal systems,
since the central element in this definition arises from the victim’s
lack of consent. Moreover, the Appeals Chamber states that it is
appropriate to reject the Appellants’ "resistance" requirement,
justified neither in law or fact, and that the use of force in itself is
not an element constituting rape. The coercive circumstances present in
this case made the victims’ consent to the instant sexual acts
impossible. The grounds of appeal relating to the definition of the
crime of rape are therefore rejected.

C. Definition of the crime of torture:

The Appellants concerned did not challenge the definition of torture but
asserted that the constitutive elements of the crime of torture have not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The Appeals Chamber
wishes to specify that some acts establish per se the suffering of those
upon whom they are inflicted. Rape is obviously such an act. Moreover,
the sexual motivation to which the accused admitted certainly does not
exclude the intent to commit an act which has as a consequence severe
pain and suffering or the purpose of discrimination. The grounds of
appeal relating to the crime of torture are rejected.

D. Definition of the crime of outrages upon personal dignity (Kovac):

According to the Appellant Kovac, the Trial Chamber did not define which
acts are likely to constitute outrages upon personal dignity or
establish a specific intent on his part to humiliate or degrade the
victim. However, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber
correctly defined the objective threshold for an act to constitute an
outrage upon personal dignity, that is "any act or omission which would
be generally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or
otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity". Moreover, the Trial
Chamber rightly considered that it sufficed that the Appellant knew, as
any reasonable person would have, that his acts could cause serious
humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a serious attack on human
dignity. The grounds of appeal relating to the definition of the crime
of outrages upon personal dignity are rejected.

IV. CUMULATIVE CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS:
The Appeals Chamber rejects the argument that the crimes were
inappropriately charged and considers it even unnecessary to rehearse in
this Appeals Judgement a settled jurisprudence on this point.

With regard to the cumulative convictions, the Appeals Chamber applied
the method set out in the Delalic ("Celebici") Appeals Judgement. It,
like the Trial Chamber, considers that convictions for the same conduct
under Article 5 of the Statute (crimes against humanity) and Article 3
of the Statute (violations of the laws or customs of war) are
permissible and dismisses the appeal on this point.

As regards the Appellants’ arguments in respect of cumulative
convictions under Article 5, given the circumstances of the case, the
Appeals Chamber concludes that all the constitutive elements of rape and
torture exist. It is also possible to cumulate, under Article 3 of the
Statute, a conviction for rape and a conviction for torture for the same
conduct. The crimes of rape and torture each contain one materially
distinct element. In this case, for cumulative convictions under both
Article 5 and Article 3, rape and sexual violence constitute acts of
torture. The Appeals Chamber therefore rejects the appeal on this point.

The Appellant Kovac’s separate ground of appeal: the Appellant Kovac
argues that he was wrongly convicted of both rape and outrages upon
personal dignity under Article 3 of the Statute. The Appeals Chamber
rejects the argument, considering that the Trial Chamber did not base
its convictions on the same conduct.

All the other grounds of appeal relating to cumulative convictions are
rejected.

V. INDIVIDUAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL:

Errors of fact alleged by Kunarac:

The Appeals Chamber rejects all of the grounds of appeal raised by
Kunarac against the Trial Chamber’s factual findings regarding his alibi
and counts 1 to 4, 9 and 10, 11 and 12, and 18 to 20. The Appellant has
not shown that the Trial Chamber committed an error of fact occasioning
a miscarriage of justice.

Errors of fact alleged by Kovac:

The Appeals Chamber rejects all of Kovac’s grounds of appeal against the
Trial Chamber’s factual findings regarding his identification, the
conditions in his apartment, the offences committed against FWS-75,
A.B., FWS-87, and A.S., the outrages upon personal dignity, the sale of
FWS-87 and A.S. and the rape convictions. The Appellant has not shown
that the Trial Chamber committed an error of fact occasioning a
miscarriage of justice.

Errors of fact alleged by Vukovic:

The Appeals Chamber rejects the appeal brought by the Appellant Vukovic
against the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding the alleged omissions
noted in the Indictment, the rape of FWS-50, his identification and the
evaluation of the exculpatory evidence. The Appellant has not shown that
the Trial Chamber committed an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage
of justice.

VI. GROUNDS OF APPEAL RELATING TO SENTENCING:

A. Single sentence:

The accused presented grounds asserting, in substance, that the Rules do
not authorise the imposition of a single sentence and that for each
crime of which an accused has been convicted an individual sentence
should be handed down. The Appeals Chamber holds that neither Rule 87(C)
nor Rule 101(C) of the 18th edition of the Rules prohibited a Trial
Chamber from imposing a single sentence and recalls that single
sentences are not unknown in the Tribunal’s practice. These grounds are
dismissed.

B. Recourse to the sentencing practice in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia:

The Appellants argue that the Trial Chamber should have conformed to the
general sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia, in particular, in
the sense that the sentence under appeal should not exceed the maximum
applied by the courts of the former Yugoslavia. The Appeals Chamber
holds that although a Trial Chamber must take into consideration the
general sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia it is not bound by
such practice. The Appeals Chamber confirms the findings of the Trial
Judgement which stated that it is established case-law at the Tribunal
that the practice of the courts in the former Yugoslavia does not bind
the Trial Chambers in the determination of a sentence. The Trial Chamber
did indeed review the sentencing practice applied by the courts of the
former Yugoslavia by way of hearing a Defence expert witness on the
matter and thereby complied with the provisions of Article 24(1) of the
Statute and Rule 101(B)(iii) of the Rules. It did not venture outside
its discretion in setting the sentence, nor did it err on this point.
These grounds of appeal are rejected.

C. Aggravating factors:

The Appellants submitted that their crimes should not have incurred the
sentences pronounced because certain related aggravating factors were
not properly evaluated:

1. Vulnerability of certain victims:

Article 24(2) of the Statute states that in imposing the sentences, the
Trial Chambers must take into account the gravity of the offence.
Whether or not the vulnerability of the victim is an element of the
crime of rape does not affect its being evidence of the gravity of the
crime and that, within the meaning of the Statute, such gravity may be
duly evaluated during the determination of the sentence. The Trial
Chamber committed no error in this respect, and this ground of appeal is
therefore rejected.

2. Alleged contradictions in the Trial Judgement (Kunarac):

The Appellant Kunarac contends that the Trial Chamber reached
contradictory findings in paragraphs 858 and 863 with regard to his role
in the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The two paragraphs at
issue clearly state that, as far as these crimes are concerned, he was
not considered as being in a position of command. This ground of appeal
is therefore without merit and the Chamber dismisses it.

3. Issue of the age of the victims, all but one younger than 19:

The Trial Chamber rightly took into consideration the evidence of the
Defence expert witness on the sentences incurred for the crime of rape
in the former Yugoslavia who confirmed that, in that country, aggravated
factors were attached to the rape of young girls under the age of 18. In
the view of the Appeals Chamber, the expert’s evidence did not
contradict the prevailing practice in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. By virtue of its inherent discretionary power,
the Trial Chamber was entitled to consider that the age of 19 is
sufficiently close to the protected age of special vulnerability for it
to view that age as an aggravating factor. As for the Appellant
Vukovic’s allegation that an error was committed in evaluating the age
of victim FWS-50, the Appeals Chamber responds that the fact that two
slightly different ages were given to the victim in the Trial Judgement
(approximately 16 and 15½) takes nothing away from the fact that she was
young, and that this could constitute an aggravating factor. The Appeals
Chamber therefore finds that the Trial Chamber did not make an error in
taking into consideration the young age of the victims specified in the
Trial Judgement. Accordingly, these grounds of appeal are dismissed.

4. Aggravating factor of enslavement over a long period (Kunarac) or the
prolonged character of mistreatment inflicted upon some of the victims
(Kovac):

The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that duration may be a
factor to take into account "when considering whether someone was
enslaved" but that it is not one of the elements of the offence. The
longer the period of enslavement, the more serious the offence. The
Appeals Chamber subscribes to the opinion of the Trial Chamber that the
duration of the crimes of enslavement, rape and outrages upon personal
dignity, between one month and four months approximately, was
sufficiently long to incur an aggravation of the sentence. As such,
these grounds of appeal are dismissed.

5. Issue of the discriminatory grounds, an element of the offences
punishable under Article 5 of the Statute or an aggravating factor:

The Appellant Kunarac claimed that the Trial Chamber erred in regarding
the discriminatory intent as an aggravating factor as it allegedly
constitutes an element of the crimes specified under Article 5 of the
Statute. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber recalls the Tadic Appeal
Judgement which states that discriminatory intent "is an indispensable
legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for
which this is expressly required, that is, for Article 5(h) of the
Statute, concerning various types of persecution". It is not required
for the other offences listed under Article 5 of the Statute.
Consequently, this ground of appeal is rejected.

6. Issue of retribution as a sentencing purpose (Kovac):

In the case-law of both this Tribunal and the ICTR, retribution has
always been taken into consideration as a purpose of the sentencing, it
being "interpreted [...] as punishment of an offender for his specific
criminal conduct". The Appellant failed to substantiate his claim of an
alleged trend in international law which speaks differently from the one
followed by this Tribunal and the ICTR. This ground of appeal is
therefore dismissed.

D. Mitigating factors:

KUNARAC
The Appellant claims that the fact that none of the victims has suffered
any severe consequences at his hands should be considered as a
mitigating factor, as should the fact that he is the father of three
young children. The inherent gravity of these offences, as the starting
point for the sentencing procedure, demands severe punishment, which
will not be diminished because the offences are claimed to have produced
no serious effects for the victims. This ground of appeal is therefore
rejected. The Appeals Chamber holds that the family aspect should have
been taken into consideration as a mitigating factor. This ground of
appeal is thus partly successful. However, in view of the number and
severity of the offences committed, the Appeals Chamber finds that the
sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is the appropriate one and thus
upholds the decision in this regard.

KOVAC
The Appellant argues that the Trial Chamber should have taken into
account the fact that he had no intention to harm Muslims, nor the
knowledge that his actions formed part of a widespread and systematic
attack. Before the sentencing proceedings, the Trial Chamber had already
accepted these factors as being proved beyond all reasonable doubt,
resulting in a conviction. The Appellant thus cannot re-litigate this
issue in the course of the sentencing appeal. This ground of appeal is
therefore dismissed.

As regards the second mitigating factor raised by the Appellant, the
Appeals Chamber merely notes that the four women he kept in his
apartment against their will and mistreated were Muslims. It rejects
this unreasoned ground of appeal.

Lastly, the Appellant pleads his relationship with FWS-87 and the
protection he extended to her and to A.S.. The Appeals Chamber agrees
with the Trial Chamber’s view that the relationship between the
Appellant and FWS-87 was not one of love, "but rather one of cruel
opportunism on Kovac’s part, of constant abuses and domination over a
girl who, at the relevant time, was only about 15 years old" and with
the finding that the Appellant "substantially assisted Jagos Kostic in
raping A.S.". This ground of appeal is rejected.

VUKOVIC
The Appellant argues that he helped "numerous [...] Muslim families",
that no serious consequences arose from his acts and that no force or
compulsion was used. Lastly, the Appellant submits that the fact that he
is married and has two children should also be taken into consideration.
The Appeals Chamber holds that the Appellant’s help to other Muslims in
the conflict does not change the fact that he committed serious crimes
against FWS-50, that his acts did have serious consequences and that, as
the Trial Judgement rightly points out, force or compulsion was used
prior to rape. These grounds of appeal are thus rejected. As for the
Appellant’s family situation, it should admittedly have been considered
as a mitigating factor but, although it allows this ground of appeal,
the Appeals Chamber concurs with the length of the imprisonment decided
by the Trial Chamber.

E. Credit for time served:

The Trial Chamber did make an Oral Statement, on 22 February 2001,
stating that the time spent in custody would be credited to the
sentences of the three convicted persons. If the Appellants had had the
slightest doubt, they could have, through their Counsel, raised the
matter immediately before the Trial Chamber for clarification. That
would have been the proper forum. These grounds of appeal are dismissed,
provided that the last paragraph of the Trial Judgement is read together
with the Oral Statement of the Trial Chamber of 22 February 2001. The
Appellants will therefore receive credit for time served in detention as
calculated from the moment they surrendered to the Tribunal or were
placed in its custody.

Will the Accused please rise.

DISPOSITION:

For the foregoing reasons,

A. The Appeals of Dragoljub Kunarac against convictions and sentence

1. Convictions

The Appeals Chamber:
DISMISSES the appeal brought by Dragoljub Kunarac against his
convictions.
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the convictions entered by the
Trial Chamber for Dragoljub Kunarac on Counts 1-4, 9-12 and 18-20 of
Indictment IT-96-23.

2. Sentence

The Appeals Chamber:
DISMISSES the appeal brought by Dragoljub Kunarac against his sentence;
CORRECTS the formal disposition of the Trial Judgement to reflect the
Oral Statement made by the Trial Chamber that credit should be given for
time served and, accordingly, Dragoljub Kunarac is entitled to credit
for the time he has spent in custody since his surrender on 4 March
1998;
AND
CONSIDERING the number and severity of the offences committed, FINDS
that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the sentence of 28 years’
imprisonment as imposed by the Trial Chamber.

B. The Appeals of Radomir Kovac against convictions and sentence

1. Convictions
The Appeals Chamber:
DISMISSES the appeal brought by Radomir Kovac against his convictions.
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the convictions entered by the
Trial Chamber for Radomir Kovac on Counts 22-25 of Indictment IT-96-23.

2. Sentence
The Appeals Chamber:
DISMISSES the appeal brought by Radomir Kovac against his sentence;
CORRECTS the formal disposition of the Trial Judgement to reflect the
Oral Statement made by the Trial Chamber that credit should be given for
time served and, accordingly, Radomir Kovac is entitled to credit for
the time he has spent in custody since his arrest on 2 August 1999;
AND
CONSIDERING the number and severity of the offences committed, FINDS
that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the sentence of 20 years’
imprisonment as imposed by the Trial Chamber.

C. The Appeals of Zoran Vukovic against convictions and sentence

1. Convictions
The Appeals Chamber:
DISMISSES the appeal brought by Zoran Vukovic against his convictions.
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the convictions entered by the
Trial Chamber for Zoran Vukovic on Counts 33-36 of Indictment
IT-96-23/1.

2. Sentence

The Appeals Chamber:

DISMISSES the appeal brought by Zoran Vukovic against his sentence;
CORRECTS the formal disposition of the Trial Judgement to reflect the
Oral Statement made by the Trial Chamber that credit should be given for
time served and, accordingly, Zoran Vukovic is entitled to credit for
the time he has spent in custody since his arrest on 23 December 1999;
AND
CONSIDERING the number and severity of the offences committed, FINDS
that the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber is appropriate.
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber AFFIRMS the sentence of 12 years’
imprisonment as imposed by the Trial Chamber.

D. Enforcement of Sentences

In accordance with Rules 103(C) and 107 of the Rules, the Appeals
Chamber orders that Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic
are to remain in the custody of the International Tribunal pending the
finalisation of arrangements for their transfers to the State or States
where their respective sentences will be served.
[Source: ICTY Press Release, CVO/ P.I.S./679-E - The Hague, 12 June
2002]

Full text of judgment available at:
http://www.un.org/icty/foca/appeal/judgement/index.htm
--
FIN DEL MENSAJE END OF MESAGGE EINDE BERICHT FIM DA MENSAGEM FINE
DEL MESSAGGIO ENDE NACHRICHT FIN DEL MENSAJE END OF MESAGGE
EINDE BERICHT FIM DA MENSAGEM FINE DEL MESSAGGIO ENDE NACHRICHT
************************************************************************

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